How Did The Sarbanes Oxley Act Affect CEO Pay Structure and Pay-Performance Sensitivity? / Kawtar OUAHMAN / 2019

Titre : How Did The Sarbanes Oxley Act Affect CEO Pay Structure and Pay-Performance Sensitivity? Type de document : Mémoire Auteurs : Kawtar OUAHMAN, Auteur Année de publication : 2019 Importance : 26 p. Note générale : Pour accéder aux fichiers PDF, merci de vous identifier sur le catalogue avec votre compte Office 365 via le bouton CONNEXION en haut de page. Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Management DIRECTION GENERALE ; REMUNERATION ; PERFORMANCE ; NORME COMPTABLE ; GRANDE ENTREPRISE Résumé : This paper aims to examine the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, enacted in July 2002, on CEOs pay structure and, on the pay-performance sensitivity using an accounting-based indicator as our performance proxy. We will base our analysis on Compustat Execucomp data from 1995 to 2005 (including the year 2002 in the post Sarbanes Oxley era), our sample will consist of the S&P 100 firms. We hypothesize that companies will respond to the additional risk imposed to CEOs by changing the mix of salary and incentives, consistent with this claim we find that firms increased salary compensation portion of total compensation and reduced options compensation portion of total compensation. We also hypothesize that the improvement of financial disclosure will enable shareholders to have a more transparent view of the companies real performance, unbiased by earnings management that CEOs tend to use in order to improve the financial reporting data; therefore as the accounting information is more reliable, it will be used as a determinant of pay relative to performance, consistent with this claim, we find that pay-performance sensitivity increased in the post SOX era. Note de contenu : Bibliographie p. 22-23 Programme : PGE-Reims Spécialisation : Finance d’Entreprise - Corporate Finance Permalink : https://cataloguelibrary.neoma-bs.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=496426