| Titre : |
Do CEO compensation in the S&P 500 most innovative firms improve their performance? |
| Type de document : |
Mémoire |
| Auteurs : |
Kristel BAUDRION, Auteur |
| Année de publication : |
2019 |
| Importance : |
29 p. |
| Note générale : |
Pour accéder aux fichiers PDF, merci de vous identifier sur le catalogue avec votre compte Office 365 via le bouton CONNEXION en haut de page. |
| Langues : |
Anglais (eng) |
| Mots-clés : |
Management
DIRECTION GENERALE ; INNOVATION ; PERFORMANCE ; STOCK OPTION ; REMUNERATION
|
| Résumé : |
Previous researches show that CEO long-term pay-for-performance incentives (restricted stocks and unvested options) have a positive relationship with CEO behaviour to turn to innovation projects. Starting from the hypothesis that innovation in highly innovative firms was one of the most important factors in the performance of these firms, how CEO compensation (long-term incentives), in the most innovative firms, improves the firm performance? This research examines the relationship between long-term pay-for-performance incentives and firm performance in highly innovative firms. Results from a sample of 200 companies suggest that long-term pay-for-performance incentives are mainly introduced in highly innovative firms. Moreover, it does not appear clearly that these kinds of incentives have a positive relationship with performance. Indeed, the influence of long-term incentives on firm performance cannot be proved explicitly.
Keywords: Long-term pay-for-performance incentives, innovation, top innovative firms, performance |
| Note de contenu : |
Bibliographie p. 27-29 |
| Programme : |
PGE-Reims |
| Spécialisation : |
Finance d’Entreprise - Corporate Finance |
| Permalink : |
https://cataloguelibrary.neoma-bs.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=496423 |
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Do CEO compensation in the S&P 500 most innovative firms improve their performance? / 2019 
